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when wage setting by a centralized trade union leads to unemployment. It is
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1 Introduction
Opening up the borders for international migration is one heavily disputed response to
the old-age security crisis faced by most industrialized countries. Proponents of such
measures often point to the beneficial impact on the old-age dependency ratio arising
from age differentials between average migrants and natives.1 Formalized by Razin
and Sadka (1999, 2000) in the context of a full employment economy, this argument
is a driving force behind the net positive fiscal effect of immigration identified by
quantitative studies (Storesletten, 2000; Sinn, 2001).
Obviously, the strength of this reasoning is intimately linked to the aggregate employ-
ment effects of immigration. However, these effects are ambiguous, once the unrealistic
assumption of full employment is abandoned (Schmidt et al., 1994; Razin and Sadka,
1995; Fuest and Thum, 2000). In the binding minimum wage economy of Razin and
Sadka (1995), for example, immigration has no consequences for total employment,
which renders a positive effect on pensions impossible.
The literature on immigration to economies with labor market distortions typically does
not consider pay-as-you-go pensions. Nevertheless, it suggests that the stabilizing role
of immigration for public pensions emerges in those settings where wages are flexible
enough to absorb some of the increased labor supply. This presumption is corroborated
by the findings in Kemnitz (2003), the only study known to the author, which explicitly
links immigration and public pensions in the presence of unemployment.
Explaining unemployment as the result of trade union power, Kemnitz (2003) adheres
to the standard model where unions are organized at the firm level. However, as
emphasized by a number studies originating with Calmfors and Driffill (1988), there
is significant international variation in the degree of union centralization. Therefore,
firm level bargaining may be a poor description of the wage setting process in many
countries, with unexplored implications for the labor market effects of immigration.
This paper scrutinizes the existence of beneficial effects of immigration on public pen-
sions in an economy where the labor market is dominated by a large trade union
pursuing the interest of workers. It shows that the consideration of union centraliza-
tion reverts the above argument in favor of immigrant workers. In any unemployment
1 However, this argumentation neglects the fact that these immigrants become entitled for later pen-
sion benefits. Therefore, the continuity of the improvement depends on the pension contributions
by the immigrant offspring. See Razin and Sadka (1999), Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and
Krieger (2004) for a discussion.
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equilibrium, immigration is found to harm public pensions whenever it increases the
total number of jobs. An alleviation of the demographic burden of social security occurs
only if total employment declines. Whether this is the case depends on the existing
level of unemployment in the host economy.
The economic intuition behind this result rests on the fact that the trade union chooses
a wage in the inelastic part of labor demand. If it did not, the union could increase
the expected utility of its members by a wage cut: with elastic labor demand, a wage
reduction would not only mitigate income uncertainty by lowering the unemployment
rate, but also increase the wage bill, the total amount of resources available to the work-
force. But given the inelasticity of labor demand, any job creation due to immigration
necessarily erodes the wage bill, the base of public pension financing.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and derives
the labor market equilibrium. Section 3 deals with the effects of immigration. Some
concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.
2 The Model
Consider an an economy of two overlapping generations where people work in the first
period of life, supplying inelastically one unit of labor, and retire in the second. The
size of each native generation is normalized to unity: Nt = 1. However, the workforce
increases unexpectedly in period t due to the immigration of Mt workers from other
countries.
In every period, atomistic firms produces the single output good by a standard neo-
classical production function combining physical capital K and labor L:
Yt = F (Kt, Lt) = Ltf(kt),
where kt = Kt/Lt is the capital intensity. Profit maximization leads to the usual
marginal productivity conditions:
rt = f
′(kt), (1)
wt = f(kt)− ktf ′(kt). (2)
The capital market is competitive and the interest rate rt adjusts such that the existing
capital stock is fully utilized. However, aggregate employment is endogenous, as firms
Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden 3
hire labor only up to the point where its marginal productivity equals the wage rate wt
set by the trade union. The determinants of union behavior will be discussed below.
From (2) and (1), a wage increase reduces employment and the interest rate:
∂Lt
∂wt
=
Lt
f ′′(kt)k2t
< 0, (3)
∂rt
∂wt
= − 1
kt
< 0. (4)
For further reference, we define the elasticity of labor demand as: εt =
f(kt)−ktf ′(kt)
f ′′(kt)k2t
< 0.
Every individual born in period t receives utility out of consumption in both periods
of life according to the utility function:
Ut = U(c
i
t, z
i
t+1). (5)
To simplify matters, (5) is the same for all individuals and obeys the usual concavity
and Inada properties.
Let the employment status of a young household be denoted by i ∈ {E,U}. Employed
individuals earn a net wage (1−τU −τP )wt, where τU and τP are the contribution rates
to unemployment insurance and public pensions. Unemployed individuals receive the
unemployment benefit bt, whereas the current old are paid the pension p
i
t. Hence, the
consumption constraints are:
cit = d(1− τU − c)wt + (1− d)bt − sit, (6)
zit+1 = p
i
t+1 + (1 + rt+1)s
i
t, (7)
where sit are private savings and d = 1 ⇐⇒ i = E and d = 0 ⇐⇒ i = U . Following
Cassamatta et al. (2000), the public pension consists of a demogrant benefit p¯t and an
earnings related component where Ωt denotes the equivalence factor:
pit+1 = p¯t+1 + Ωt+1(dwt + (1− d)bt).
After the employment status is known, individuals decide on the amount of individual
old-age savings, characterized by the first-order condition:
ui1 +Ru
i
2 = 0, (8)
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where we abbreviate notation according to: ui1 = u1(c
i
t, z
i
t+1). Individual indirect utility
in state i can be written as v(I it , rt+1), I
i
t = c
i
t + zt+1/(1 + rt+1) denoting discounted
lifetime income. This leads to the expected indirect utility of a generation t individual:
Vt = (1− ηt)v(IEt , rt+1) + ηtv(IUt , rt+1), (9)
where ηt is the unemployment probability of a member of generation t to be unemployed
during youth. By the law of large numbers, ηt is also equal to the unemployment
rate. We posit that employment chances are distributed equally across all households,
including immigrants: ηt =
Nt+Mt−Lt
Nt+Mt
. Moreover, we assume that individuals are risk
averse, that is indirect utility is concave in income:2
∂v
∂I it
> 0,
∂2v
∂I it
2 < 0.
For simplicity, physical capital depreciates after one period. As a consequence, the
capital stock in every period is determined by the savings of the last period:
Kt+1 = ηt(Nt +Mt)s
U
t + (1− ηt)(Nt +Mt)sEt . (10)
The welfare state of the economy cares for both the unemployed and the elderly. Taking
both contribution rates as constant over time, budget balance requires:
τUwtLt = bt(Nt +Mt − Lt), (11)
τPwtLt = (Nt−1 +Mt−1)p¯t + Ωt(wt−1Lt−1 + bt(Nt−1 +Mt−1 − Lt−1)). (12)
The assumption of a constant τU is usual in the literature, see Razin and Sadka (1999)
and Casarico and Devillanova (2003). In the context of small unions, Kemnitz (2004)
has shown that a constant contribution rate to unemployment insurance is more con-
ducive to wage flexibility and hence immigrant employment creation than other social
policies.
All workers of a generation are organized in a trade union, acting in the current interest
of workers. In contrast to the existing literature (Corneo and Marquardt, 2000; Irmen
and Wigger, 2002), this union is large in the sense that it controls the economy-wide
wage.
2 This property results from various assumptions on direct utility (5), the most obvious one being
additive separability: U12 = 0.
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In any standard overlapping-generation framework like the present one, the conflict
between labor and capital is necessarily also a conflict between the young and the old,
since present union members become capitalists later in life. Therefore, maximizing the
current utility of workers has to be distinguished from maximizing expected lifetime
utility. In the latter case, the union would have to take the consequences of current
wage setting on future interest rates and wages via aggregate savings into account. But
as a higher return on capital impinges on the wage, such a union would actively pursue
the interest of future capitalists at the expense of future workers.3 This would seriously
blur the general identification of a trade union as the agent representing labor. Hence,
we restrict the concern of the union to the current utility of workers, internalizing the
effect of its decisions on the unemployment rate and welfare state budgets, but paying
no attention to dynamic repercussions on factor prices.
As a consequence, the problem of the trade union in period t is to maximize (9) with
respect to wt for a given capital stock Kt and future interest rate rt+1, taking the
marginal productivity conditions (1) and (2), individual utility maximization (8) and
the welfare state budgets (11) and (12) into account. Using vit = v
i
t(I
i
t , rt+1) as a
shortcut, we have the first order condition:
∂Lt
∂wt
vEt + Lt
∂vEt
∂IEt
∂IEt
∂wt
− ∂Lt
∂wt
vUt + (Nt +Mt − Lt)
∂vUt
∂Iut
∂IUt
∂wt
≤ 0, (13)
with strict equality if Lt < Nt +Mt.
Proposition 1. In any labor market equilibrium with unemployment, the union sets
a wage in the inelastic region of labor demand.
Proof. Unemployment results if the second-order condition ∂
2Vt
∂w2
< 0 is fulfilled and
(13) holds with equality. Multiplying that expression by w/L and inserting:
∂IEt
∂wt
= (1− τU − τP ) + ( Ωt+1
1 + rt+1
) =
IEt − p¯t+11+rt+1
wt
,
∂IUt
∂wt
=
(
1 +
Ωt+1
1 + rt+1
)
τULt [(Nt +Mt − Lt)(1 + εt) + εtLt]
(Nt +Mt − Lt)2
= (1 + εt)
IEt − p¯t+11+rt+1
wt
+
(1 + Ωt+1
1+rt+1
)τUεtL
2
t
(Nt +Mt − Lt)2
3 This complication is original to the assumption of a large union. As emphasized by Devereux and
Lockwood (1991), the wage policy of a small union has a negligible impact on aggregate savings
and hence the interest rate.
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leads to:
εt
[
v(IEt )− v(IUt )
]
+
∂vEt
∂IEt
(IEt −
p¯t+1
1 + rt+1
) + εt
∂vUt
∂IUt
(IUt −
p¯t+1
1 + rt+1
)
+ (1 + εt)τUwt
∂vUt
∂IUt
(1 +
Ωt+1
1 + rt+1
) = 0.
Expansion by εt
∂vEt
∂IEt
(IEt − p¯t+11+rt+1 ) gives:
εt
[
v(IEt )−
∂vEt
∂IEt
(IEt − p¯t+1)− vUt +
∂vUt
∂IUt
(IUt −
p¯t+1
1 + rt+1
)
]
+ (1 + εt)
[
∂vUt
∂IUt
τUwt(1 +
Ωt+1
(1 + rt+1)
) +
∂vEt
∂IEt
(IEt −
p¯t+1
1 + rt+1
)
]
= 0. (14)
Because V (I)− ∂V
∂I
(I − x) increases in I:
∂[V (I)− ∂V
∂I
(I − x)]
∂I
= −∂
2V
∂I2
(I − x) > 0,
the first row in (14) has a negative sign. The term in square brackets in the second
row being unambiguously positive, (14) can hold only if ε > −1, rendering the second
row positive.
Increasing the wage has two effects. On the one hand, the reduction in employment
diminishes the expected utility of risk averse workers. On the other hand, it affects the
wage bill, the total income available to the workforce. In any part of the labor demand
curve which is not inelastic, a wage reduction improves equality without sacrificing total
income, and therefore increases the expected utility of workers. Hence, any equilibrium
wage leading to unemployment must trade off the higher income risk with the higher
total income due to a wage increase, which requires labor demand to be inelastic in
equilibrium.
From a modelling perspective, the existence of an unemployment equilibrium in the
presence of union centralization is a delicate issue. Layard et al. (1991) set forth a
number of arguments why union centralization is likely to lead to full employment,
including the fact that unemployment can never result when the technology implies
a generally elastic labor demand. However, empirical evidence supports neither such
a technology nor an absence of unemployment in economies with centralized wage
setting.4 This makes an analysis of the unemployment equilibrium worthwhile.
4 According to Hamermesh (1993), Table 3.2, estimates of the wage elasticity of unconditional factor
demand, which is the relevant variable here, average around unity. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004),
Table 12.13 report an average unemployment rate in centralized economies of 9% in 1993.
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3 The Effects of Immigration
We now consider the impact of immigration on employment and the welfare state. To
simplify the exposition, we assume that unemployment exists before and after immi-
gration. This will be discussed at the end of this section.
Proposition 2. Immigration leads to a rise of the unemployment benefit and has an
ambiguous impact on total employment. Employment rises (falls) if the unemployment
rate is lower (higher) than the absolute value of the elasticity of labor demand.
Proof. From (14):
dLt
dMt
= −
∂2Vt
∂wt∂Mt
∂2Vt
∂wt∂Lt
,
where the denominator is positive due to the second order condition of the union’s
maximization problem (∂
2Vt
∂w2t
< 0). The sign of the numerator:
∂2Vt
∂w∂M
= −∂
2vUt
∂IUt
2
(
1 +
Ωt+1
1 + rt+1
)2
τUwtLt
Nt +Mt − Lt)2 [τU(1 + ε)wt + εbt]
equals the sign of the last term in square brackets. Employing (11) yields:
∂2Vt
∂w∂M
R 0 ⇐⇒ Lt R (1 + ε)(Nt +Mt),
and hence dLt
dMt
R 0 ⇐⇒ Lt Q (1 + ε)(Nt + Mt). Due to ε < −1, the direction of the
employment effect is ambiguous. Because of Lt = (1− ηt)(Nt +Mt):
dLt
dMt
R 0 ⇐⇒ ηt R −εt.
The unemployment benefit reacts according to:
dbt
dMt
= −wt
εt
[Lt − (1 + εt)(Nt +Mt)] dLt
dMt
,
which is positive because the term in square brackets has the same sign as dLt
dMt
.
If the wage (and hence total employment) remained at the pre-migration level, immi-
gration would decrease the unemployment benefit and make the state of unemployment
more likely. Because members are risk averse, the union adjusts the wage to correct for
this imbalance. However, the inelasticity of labor demand makes the direction of this
adjustment ambiguous: cutting the wage brings more individuals into employment on
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the one hand, but diminishes total contributions on the other hand. If the unemploy-
ment rate is very high, the effect on the dependency ratio is stronger and the union
mitigates the demanded wage. For low unemployment, the total contribution effect
dominates and the wage rises.
While immigration increases social protection for the unemployed unambiguously, we
now consider the effect on public pensions.
Proposition 3. Immigration alleviates the demographic burden only if it decreases
total employment.
Proof. Let Pt = τPwtLt denote the total amount paid to the retirees in period t.
Immigration affects these revenues according to:
∂Pt
∂Mt
=
τPwt
Nt−1 +Mt−1
(
1 +
1
ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
) dLt
dMt
.
With the number of pensioners and the contribution rate being fixed, pension payments
to the old are a given fraction of the total wage bill. This wage bill increases only when
total employment decreases. This turns the usual argument that immigration helps
the welfare state through higher employment upside down.
Combining Proposition 2 and 3, one can conclude that immigration helps the soundness
of public pensions only if the unemployment rate exceeds the absolute value of the
elasticity of labor demand. In the light of the empirical estimates on εt lying around
unity, this is unlikely to be the case. Rather, our results predict immigration to increase
aggregate employment and to harm public old-age security.
Up to here, we have presumed that the economy remains in an unemployment equi-
librium. However, one can not rule out that the union sets the full employment wage
after immigration. However, this would mean that immigration is a perfect cure to
the whole problem of unemployment. But even if that happened, the total wage bill
need not increase. Consider for example a CES production function with an elasticity
of substitution below unity, where labor demand is inelastic for all employment levels
above a certain threshold value.5 As the shift to the corner solution implies a rise
in employment, the new equilibrium must feature inelastic labor demand whenever
unemployment prevailed before immigration.
5 For elasticities of substitution of unity and above, labor demand is unambiguously elastic every-
where.
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4 Conclusion
This paper puts some caution on the conventional wisdom that immigrant labor im-
proves the financial sustainability of pay-as-you-go financed pensions. In a model with
centralized wage setting, it was shown that immigration benefits the retirees only if
total employment declines. The creation of additional jobs, in contrast, harms old-age
security. This finding originates in the fact that labor demand is inelastic in equi-
librium. Consequently, any employment increase reduces the wage bill, the source of
public pension financing.
It should be stressed that inelasticity of labor demand can also hold in other labor
market settings, including full employment. However, the existing literature on the
effect of immigration and public pensions (Razin and Sadka, 2000; Casarico and Dev-
illanova, 2003; Kemnitz, 2003) has masked this possibility by relying on technologies
with generally elastic labor demands. This paper, in contrast, highlights the structural
interrelation between inelasticity and centralized union wage setting.
In line with the public debate, the analysis has focussed on the short-run impact of im-
migration on public pensions, which should clearly be disentangled from utility effects.
Consider a current retiree, the income of whom consists of both pension payments
and capital returns. Immigration exerts countervailing effects on both sources: when
employment increases, total pension contributions decrease but the interest rate rises,
whereas the opposite is true for an employment decline. Therefore, the attitude of the
retirees towards immigration is ambiguous. Also, the impact on the income of the cur-
rent young is unclear. Immigration increases the unemployment benefit, but increases
or decreases net earnings of the employed, depending on the direction of the wage
adjustment. Accordingly, the probability to enter the state of employment changes.
For the overall utility of the young, the interest rate prevailing in the next period plays
a crucial role. Among others, the return to capital in a period depends on current wage
setting and on the level of the capital stock, which is affected by former wage setting
via savings decisions. Therefore, any conclusions are highly sensitive to assumptions on
the income dependency of the savings ratio, the relation between the capital stock and
the elasticity of labor demand and the pension contribution rate, determining the mix
between private and public funding of old-age consumption. These aspects, not lying
at the heart of the public debate and distracting attention from the key mechanism
behind our results, are left for future research.
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